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Credit rating agencies emphasize the importance of specific financial ratio thresh-
olds in their rating process. Firms on the favorable side of these thresholds are more
likely to receive higher ratings than similar firms that are not. I show that firms near
these salient thresholds respond to the incentive to improve their appearance on this
dimension by distorting real investment activities during periods leading up to bond
issuance. These firms are significantly more likely to reduce R&D and SG&A expen-
ditures compared to observationally similar firms not near a threshold. Subsequently,
they are more likely to experience declines in innovation output, profitability, and To-
bin’s Q. These distortions highlight an important cost of arms-length financing and an
adverse consequence of transparency in credit rating criteria.
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1 Introduction
Arms-length financing allows firms to access a deeper pool of capital and provides in-
vestors with a broader range of investment opportunities. Information intermediaries, such
as credit rating agencies (CRAs), facilitate such transactions by mitigating the inherent
information asymmetry between these two groups. CRAs bridge this gap by aggregating
several pieces of information about a firm into a single measure of creditworthiness. If firms
know that CRAs weight specific criteria more than others in the aggregation, they may have
an incentive to reallocate some of their resources toward these dimensions to achieve a better
rating. Indeed, theoretical models such as Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) show that agents
distort their behavior when they know they will be evaluated based on specific, easily mea-
surable dimensions.1 Moreover, survey evidence shows that credit ratings are a key focus for
CFOs and that the majority of managers are willing to forgo positive NPV projects to meet
short-term financial objectives (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal,
2005). Building on these ideas, I ask the following question in this paper: Do firms respond
to credit rating criteria by distorting their investment behavior at the expense of long-run
performance?
I investigate this question by examining firms’ investment behavior during periods when
their rating is arguably most important to them: prior to bond issuance. The identification
of rating-induced distortions, however, is difficult because a number of confounding factors
could affect the firms’ investment policies during these time periods. For example, a reduction
in R&D expenditures in periods leading up to bond issuance could be driven by changes in
a firm’s product life cycle or investment opportunity set. Hence, a simple examination of
changes in investment during periods prior to issuance stands little chance of separating firms’
1Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) show that principal-agent contracting frictions go beyond the tension
between incentives for effort provision and risk sharing. They show that contracts written on easily-measured
dimensions (e.g., manufacturing output quantity) can lead to an overprovision of effort by the agent on these
dimensions at the expense of more difficult to measure dimensions (e.g., output quality) that are important to
the principal (see also Baker, 1992). The theoretical models of Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) and Edmans,
Heinle, and Huang (2013) illustrate a similar friction in the context of increased disclosure.
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endogenous response to credit rating criteria from other potential factors. To overcome this
empirical challenge, I use an institutional feature of the credit rating process that induces
cross-sectional variation in the incentives for issuers to improve on a particular dimension
that CRAs emphasize, which I describe below.
The CRAs publicly release guidelines and methodologies with specific criteria that they
focus on when assessing a given firm’s creditworthiness. One primary criterion relates to
the firm’s Debt/EBITDA ratio. CRAs publish mappings from Debt/EBITDA ratio to po-
tential credit ratings which have jumps at particular ratio thresholds (see Table 1). These
thresholds–which the CRAs arbitrarily place at round numbers such as 2.0 and 3.0–are
unlikely to systematically coincide with changes in drivers of optimal investment policy.
They do, however, generate cross-sectional variation in firms’ incentives to improve their
Debt/EBITDA ratio in the periods leading up to getting a bond rated. Firms in regions
near thresholds the year prior to issuance, which I refer to as High-Incentive (H-I) Zones,
face a high expected marginal benefit from Debt/EBITDA improvement. To the extent that
improvement in the ratio is costly, these firms also face a lower immediate cost to cross a
threshold relative to firms farther away.
In my analysis, I compare the pre-issuance investment behavior and post-issuance per-
formance of firms near a salient threshold to firms that are farther away.2 The identifying
assumption is that these two sets of firms face different levels of incentives to improve their
ratio while they remain similar on unobserved dimensions that drive optimal investment
policy. The presence of multiple economically arbitrary thresholds in my sample produces
an alternating sequence of “treatment” (higher incentive to improve Debt/EBITDA) and
2Consider the salient thresholds at Debt/EBITDA=1.5, 2.0, and 2.5 as an illustrative example (there
are six such thresholds in my sample). For the Debt/EBITDA threshold of 2.0, I classify firms with
Debt/EBITDA ∈ [1.95, 2.20] a year prior to issuance as being in the treatment group (H-I Zone). I classify
firms with Debt/EBITDA ∈ [1.70, 1.95] and [2.20, 2.45] as being in the control group since they do not fall
in the H-I Zone around 2.0 or either of the adjacent thresholds. The timing of the measurement captures
the notion that firms typically recognize their financing needs in advance and then face incentives to take
actions in the periods leading up to issuance to conform to the rating criteria. Section 2 provides a more
thorough description of the classification process and its underlying rationale.
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“control” (lower incentive) groups throughout the Debt/EBITDA spectrum which lends
credibility to this assumption. In addition, I show that the two groups are well matched on
other observable factors that potentially drive investment. This research design allows me
to pin down whether firms in H-I Zones respond to the rating criteria by distorting their
investments in innovation (R&D) and organizational capital (SG&A) in the periods leading
up to getting a bond rated as compared to firms that are away from the thresholds.
Reducing these investments in long-term intangible assets provides the immediate benefit
of boosting EBITDA, while the costs of forgone investments are borne in the future. This
fundamental tension between benefits now and costs later provides incentives for myopic
managerial behavior (Narayanan, 1985; Stein, 1989). In my empirical tests, I first examine
the effect of ratings-induced incentives on R&D and SG&A investments and then examine
the long-run consequences in terms of future innovation output, profitability, and Tobin’s Q.
I find that H-I Zone issuers are about 40% more likely to reduce R&D and 10% more likely
to reduce SG&A expenditures prior to issuance than observationally similar control firms. In
terms of the size of the reductions, these firms cut their R&D expenditures by 10% and SG&A
expenditures by 3% relative to control firms. After documenting the average treatment effect,
I estimate the impact of rating criteria on investment behavior as a continuous function of a
firm’s distance to a threshold. As the distance to a salient threshold increases, firms face a
lower expected marginal benefit from improving their Debt/EBITDA ratio and higher total
cost to reach the next threshold. Thus, the overall incentive to reduce these investments
diminishes as the distance increases. The results support this notion.
The economic benefit of appearing strong on CRA-emphasized criteria is larger during
periods of high yield spreads between ratings classes. Consistent with this view, I show that
the main effects discussed above are strongest for periods with high credit spreads. During
high-credit-spread periods, defined as above sample median Baa-Aaa spread, the likelihood
of reducing investments increases by about 30% for R&D expenditures and 80% for SG&A
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expenditures over the baseline estimates. These results lend further credence to my main
claim that economic incentives driven by credit rating criteria lead to distortions in firm
behavior.
While my results so far establish a link between credit rating criteria and investment
behavior, they are silent about the long-run performance effects. Standard and Poor’s (S&P)
recognize the potential distortions that ratings can create and state the following in their
rating methodology handbook (Standard and Poor’s, 2008) [emphasis added]:
“We do not encourage companies to manage themselves with an eye toward a
specific rating. The more appropriate approach is to operate for the good of the
business as management sees it and to let the rating follow. Ironically, managing
for a very high rating can sometimes be inconsistent with the company’s ultimate
best interests, if it means being overly conservative and forgoing opportunities.”
In my next set of tests, I examine firms’ post-issuance innovation, profitability, and firm
value to study the long-run consequences of the investment changes. First, I focus on innova-
tion because of its long-term nature, its connection to R&D, and because it is an important
driver of firm value (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005) and overall economic growth (Solow,
1957; Romer, 1990). I find a reduction in the raw quantity of patents produced for the
first year after bond issuance for H-I Zone issuers, though the effects are short-lived. I
next consider patent citations, which are widely considered a better measure of the quality
and impact of innovation (see, e.g., Griliches, 1990; Trajtenberg, 1990). I find that issuers
near the salient thresholds are about 25% more likely than control firms to see declines
in patent citations. This effect persists for multiple years following bond issuance. These
results suggest that although declines are not great in the quantity of patents produced,
firms facing stronger ratings-induced incentives to improve their Debt/EBITDA ratio have
a considerably higher likelihood of declines in the quality of their innovation output. I find
similar results for future profitability. Treatment firms are about 12% and 10% more likely
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to experience declines in ROA (operating income/assets) and ROE (net income/shareholders
equity) during the years following issuance than the control group.
To more directly examine the consequences for firm value, I compute the differential
changes in industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q between treatment and control firms for four years
following issuance. The difference-in-differences estimates indicate a treatment effect of a
1.8% decline in industry-adjusted Q in the first year following issuance, which grows to an
approximately 3-3.6% decline by year four. Combined with the results on innovation, this
decline is consistent with Hall et al. (2005) who find that when a firm’s quality of patents
increase such that their average patent receives an additional citation, the firm’s market value
increases by 3%. Overall, these results show that there are real, long-term consequences as
a result of incentives to look strong on credit rating criteria in the short term.
Finally, I examine how market participants interpret the issuers’ changes in investment
behavior around the thresholds. After confirming that crossing a salient threshold is associ-
ated with improvements in credit rating, I test whether the reductions in investment around
the thresholds are penalized by the CRAs or bond investors by a lower likelihood of rating
upgrade or higher at-issuance yields. I find no such evidence.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it relates to the literature
that highlights the importance of credit ratings for firm financial policies. Kisgen (2006)
shows that firms issue less debt when they are near a credit rating upgrade or downgrade.
Hovakimian, Kayhan, and Titman (2009) and Kisgen (2009) show that firms’ financial de-
cisions are consistent with credit rating “targeting.” While these papers show that credit
ratings have a significant influence on capital structure decisions, my paper focuses on invest-
ment decisions. Moreover, this is the first paper to show that firms respond to credit rating
criteria by distorting behavior on value-relevant dimensions, such as R&D investment, in
efforts to look strong on the dimensions emphasized by the CRAs.
This paper also relates to the literature examining the nature of information and the
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tradeoffs that arise as the informational distance between contracting parties increases. With
greater distance between borrower and lender, the incentives to produce soft information
declines and lenders rely more on hard information (Stein, 2002; Petersen, 2004; Berger,
Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein, 2005).3 The use of hard information facilitates arms-
length transactions and can provide firms with greater access to capital (Faulkender and
Petersen, 2006). However, as discussed earlier, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) show that
high-powered contracts based on easily measurable outputs can have undesirable incentive
effects. This issue frequently arises in the context of measuring educational outcomes with
the concern that teachers may have incentives to “teach to the test.”4 In the context of
this paper, the “contract” between the issuer and CRA puts weight on the hard information
dimension of Debt/EBITDA and the issuer endogenously responds by focusing resources
on improving this measure at the expense of investments in innovation and organizational
capital, which are likely to have a large soft information component.
Finally, this paper also relates to the literature that explores potential adverse effects
of increased information disclosure. Hirshleifer (1971) shows that more information can
destroy ex-ante welfare-improving risk sharing opportunities and Dang, Gorton, and Holm-
strom (2012) show that increased information production can hinder liquidity in money
markets. Recent work on disclosure by Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) and Edmans et al.
(2013) highlights some costs of providing more information to investors through increased
disclosure. Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) show that increased disclosure can lead to greater
agency problems in the form of myopic behavior; managers substitute away from long-term
investments to boost short-term numbers (see also Stein, 1989). Edmans et al. (2013) present
3Rajan, Seru, and Vig (forthcoming) show that as the mortgage market transitioned from an originate-
and-hold to originate-to-distribute model, loan originators relied more on hard information such as FICO
score and loan-to-value ratios for setting interest rates on loans. Liberti and Mian (2009) show that within a
large bank, the sensitivity of loan terms to hard, objective information is greater as the hierarchical distance
between the loan officer and the ultimate decision maker increases.
4Jacob (2005) shows that teachers in the Chicago Public Schools strategically responded to high-stakes
testing by shifting more students into special education, preemptively retaining students and reallocating
focus from low-stakes subjects (science and social studies) to high stakes subject (math and reading). Neal
(2011) provides a helpful review of this literature.
6
a theoretical model that shows that an increase in disclosure can produce incentives for man-
agers to improve hard information at the expense of investment. My paper complements
these theoretical papers by providing empirical evidence that pressures to appear strong on
clearly-delineated rating criteria can lead to investment distortions and to long-run under-
performance.
I organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section 2 outlines the empirical strategy and
Section 3 describes the sample. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 presents
additional tests and robustness checks and Section 6 concludes.
2 Research Design and Identification Strategy
Credit ratings represent an opinion of debt issuers’ ability and willingness to repay debt.
This information about relative creditworthiness plays an important role in allocating capital
to firms in the economy. Credit ratings are a key factor for firms’ cost of debt capital because
of the informational content they supply to investors (Kliger and Sarig, 2000; Jorion, Liu, and
Shi, 2005; Tang, 2009) and supply-side frictions induced by ratings-based regulations (Kisgen
and Strahan, 2010; Ellul, Jotikasthira, and Lundblad, 2011; Chernenko and Sunderam, 2012;
Becker and Ivashina, 2013). In addition to their direct impact on the cost and supply of debt
for firms in the bond market, benefits of a higher credit rating include better trade credit
terms (Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan, 2012), better access to commercial paper markets,
overall financial flexibility, and reputational benefits, to name a few. Further, Jorion et al.
(2005) show that stock prices have a positive response to ratings upgrades and negative
response to downgrades with the effect particularly strong for downgrades (see also Hand,
Holthausen, and Leftwich, 1992; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001). In light of all this, it is not
surprising that credit ratings are one of the most important factors affecting firms’ financial
policies and are a key point of focus for managers (Graham and Harvey, 2001).5
5See Kisgen (2006) for an extensive discussion of the importance of credit ratings to firms.
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In their role as information intermediaries, CRAs condense many different pieces of in-
formation into a simple, easy to communicate grade of creditworthiness. Providing a simple
measure of debt serviceability and leverage, the Debt/EBITDA ratio is a prominent ratio
that CRAs emphasize, and it is the focus in this paper’s analysis. In response to this empha-
sis, firms have an incentive to appear strong on the Debt/EBITDA dimension to economize
debt costs.
While there are a number of ways that firms can affect their Debt/EBITDA ratio, I
focus on two investment decisions whose payoffs are long term in nature: R&D and SG&A.6
Because they are fully expensed the period in which they occur, reducing these expenditures
allows firms to report higher EBITDA and thus have a more favorable Debt/EBITDA ratio.
Because these investments in intangible capital generate benefits that are uncertain and may
take years to realize, managers may have an incentive to myopically reduce such expenditures
to boost EBITDA even if they would be value-increasing in the long run (Narayanan, 1985;
Stein, 1989). Graham et al. (2005) provide survey evidence that 80% of managers report
they would decrease discretionary expenses such as R&D, advertising, and maintenance and
55% report that they would delay starting a new project – even if it involved sacrificing
NPV – in efforts to meet financial targets. Also, by examining R&D expenditures, I am able
to measure the consequences of changes in investment behavior by observing future patent
performance.
To study the extent to which the incentive to look strong on CRA-emphasized dimensions
affects investment, I focus on firms’ behavior during periods when they are likely to care
about their credit rating the most: prior to bond issuance. When firms recognize there is an
upcoming financing need, they can assess where they stand in relation to the CRAs’ rating
criteria and respond by taking actions to improve that standing.7 To empirically identify
6SG&A expenditures are often seen as investments in “organizational capital” (e.g., see Lev and Rad-
hakrishnan, 2005; Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013) and include spending on items such as advertising,
information technology, and employee training.
7If they wish to have assistance in this assessment, investment banks and consulting firms provide expert
advice and institutional knowledge through their “ratings advisory” services.
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the effects of the credit ratings process on investment, however, is challenging. Consider the
following basic model:
Investmentit = f(Xit) + ψ(ratings-induced incentivesit) + ηit
Even after controlling for observable drivers of investment behavior (Xit) of firm i at time
t, a näive analysis of changes in firm investment leading up to bond issuance is problem-
atic because the effect of ratings-induced incentives is potentially confounded by multiple
unobserved factors (i.e., Cov(ratings-induced incentivesit, ηit) 6= 0). For example, firms may
reduce R&D expenditures simply because they are transitioning from development of a prod-
uct to commercialization or may reduce SG&A expenditures because they have reached the
end of a marketing campaign. To isolate the effect of ratings-induced investment distortions
from these and other such factors that influence investment decisions, I exploit multiple
discontinuities in the CRAs’ mapping from Debt/EBITDA to credit rating which generate
cross-sectional variation in incentives for firms to improve their Debt/EBITDA ratio.
CRAs provide specific information about the ranges of Debt/EBITDA that are consistent
with different ratings. Table 1A presents an excerpt from S&P’s published Corporate Rat-
ing Criteria that maps an issuer’s Debt/EBITDA ratio to a set of credit ratings (Standard
and Poor’s, 2012). S&P states that their purpose in providing such guidelines is “to make
explicit the rating outcomes that are typical for various business risk/financial risk combi-
nations.” Moody’s and Fitch also place an emphasis on financial ratio thresholds in their
published methodologies. Table 1B presents an example from the Moody’s “Global Steel
Industry” rating methodology, which shows what ranges of Debt/EBITDA are consistent
with particular credit ratings for that industry.
– Table 1: Mapping Debt/EBITDA to Credit Ratings –
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While these correspondences are not the sole determinant of the final credit rating,8
Table 1B makes clear that it behooves steel firms wishing to get an “A” rating to achieve
a Debt/EBITDA ratio below 2.0. Firms are keenly aware of the importance of these key
financial ratios for their ratings and, in turn, the importance of their rating for their cost
and access to capital.9
The key to the research design is the cross-sectional variation in firms’ incentives to im-
prove their Debt/EBITDA ratio that is induced by the presence of multiple salient Debt/EBITDA
thresholds. Drawn from S&P’s, Moody’s, and Fitch’s ratings methodologies and press re-
leases, the salient bin thresholds in the sample are 1.25, 1.50, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 4.0, and 5.0.10
Since the CRAs arbitrarily set these thresholds at round numbers, it is unlikely that the
economic primitives that drive optimal investment policy systematically vary at precisely
these points throughout the Debt/EBITDA spectrum. That is, for my identification strat-
egy to fail, an omitted variable must drive the optimal R&D policy in this specific alternating
sequence around each threshold. While all firms have an incentive to improve and appear
strong on this dimension, firms on the cusp of advancing to a better bin face the highest
expected marginal benefit from improvement in Debt/EBITDA. To the extent that improve-
ment in the ratio is costly, these firms also face a lower cost since they have less distance to
travel to cross a threshold relative to firms farther away.
For the empirical tests, I define whether an issuer is in a High-Incentive Zone (H-I Zone)
in the following simple way. Consider the threshold at Debt/EBITDA = 2.0. I consider the
upper bound of the H-I Zone around the 2.0 threshold to be 40% of the distance between 2.0
8Fracassi, Petry, and Tate (2013) show that credit rating analysts’ optimism or pessimism can affect
ratings decisions. Griffin and Tang (2012) provide evidence of subjectivity in the ratings for CDOs and its
consequences for rating accuracy.
9For example, in their 2006 annual report, Textron, Inc. states: “Our credit ratings are predominantly a
function of our ability to generate operating cash flow and satisfy certain financial ratios. Since high-quality
credit ratings provide us with access to a broad base of global investors at an attractive cost, we target a
long-term A rating from the independent debt-rating agencies.”
10There are some occasions when the rating agencies use guidance for thresholds other than the ones listed
here. The presence of such lesser used thresholds in the sample may introduce noise into the estimation and
partially mask the true effect.
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and the next worse threshold of 2.5. This equals 2.2. To capture the incentives of those with
only a slim margin between their current ratio and a worse bin, I consider the lower bound
to be 10% of the distance between 2.0 and the next better threshold of 1.5. This equals
1.95. Thus, I consider firms with Debt/EBITDA ∈ [1.95, 2.20] to be the H-I Zone around
2.0. I follow this method for each threshold in the sample based on firms’ Debt/EBITDA
ratio a year prior to issuance.11 This timing captures the notion discussed earlier that firms
typically recognize their financing needs in advance and then face incentives to take actions
in the periods leading up to issuance to conform to the rating criteria. The figure below









For each firm, I compare the relevant investments during the year leading up to getting
a new bond rated to its investments in the prior year. This first difference removes within-
firm time invariant unobserved drivers of investment. The timing of this measurement also
ensures that results are not driven by seasonality in firm policies. Next, I take the difference
between the behavior of the treatment group (those near one of the salient thresholds) and
the control group to compute the average treatment effect. Similarly, I use measures of firms’
profitability, innovation output, and Tobin’s Q a year prior to getting rated as benchmarks
for comparison when I investigate the future performance of the firms. The table below
summarizes the empirical design for firm policy Y.
11The results are robust to reasonable adjustments to this bandwidth scheme.
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Average Treatment Effect: ∆treatment −∆control
In addition to the average treatment effects I estimate using the classification approach
described above, I also perform tests that exploit finer variation in incentives using a contin-
uous measure of the issuer’s proximity to salient thresholds. Specifically, I estimate the likeli-
hood of reducing investment as a function of the distance between the firm’s Debt/EBITDA
a year prior to getting rated and the next better threshold (for example, 0.15 for a firm with
Debt/EBITDA = 2.15, 2.65, 3.15, etc.).
3 Data and Preliminary Tests
3.1 Sample Construction
Firm accounting and stock return data are from Compustat and CRSP. Bond issuance
data are from the fixed income securities database (FISD). I merge these data to form a
quarterly sample from 1990-2009. Where a firm has multiple financing observations in a
single quarter (for example, a firm may issue bonds of various tenors on the same day), I
combine them to a single observation by summing the issuance amounts and computing a
dollar-weighted average yield.
Patent data are from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Patent Ci-
tation database.12 This data source contains information on the owner, patent application
date, patent grant date, and citation count of over three million patents granted by the
United States Patent Trademark Office from 1976-2006 along with matching tables that
12See https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/
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facilitate merging these data with Compustat. I use two common measures of firm innova-
tion: patent count and citation count. Patent count is the raw number of a firm’s patent
applications during a given year that are eventually granted. Raw counts, however, do not
provide any differentiation in whether the innovations are marginal or new breakthroughs.
Trajtenberg (1990) argues that “patents vary enormously in their importance or value, and
hence, simple patent counts cannot be informative about innovative output” and proposes
citation-weighted patent counts are a better measure of innovation. I correct for bias in this
measure due to citation count truncation after 2006 by using the weight factors developed by
Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001), who use an obsolesce-diffusion model to estimate future
citations based on the patent’s year and technology category.
After dropping financial firms, utilities, and observations that are not related to a bond
issuance, the main sample contains 1770 observations from 686 firms. The sample size for
tests using R&D have fewer observations because many firms do not report R&D expen-
ditures. Tests involving patent productivity have fewer observations because the patent
database ends in 2006. I use the maximum number of observations with complete data for
each test, but my results are not substantively different if I constrain all tests to observations
with complete data across all variables.
I winsorize all variables at 1% to mitigate the effects of outliers. Table A.1 in the appendix
provides the details of the construction of variables. Table 2 presents sample summary
statistics and Figure 1 presents the distribution of the sample along Debt/EBITDA a year
prior to issuance, highlighting the H-I Zones near salient thresholds.
– Table 2: Sample Summary Statistics –
– Figure 1: Sample Debt/EBITDA and H-I Zones –
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3.2 Comparability of Treatment and Control Groups
Before presenting the main tests, I examine the comparability of the issuers in H-I Zones
with those that are not. To make meaningful inferences, it is important that issuers in H-I
Zones (treatment) are observationally similar to those that are not (control) on dimensions
that drive investment independent of the incentive effects. To evaluate the comparability,
Figure 2 presents kernel densities of several such factors for both groups. The plots show
that the sample is well balanced along firm characteristics that represent factors such as firm
life cycle (size), financial flexibility and potential debt overhang (debt-to-asset ratio), growth
opportunities (Tobin’s Q), and ability to generate internal cash flows (cash flow-to-assets);
it is also balanced in terms of profitability as measured by ROA (operating income/assets)
and ROE (net income/shareholder equity). In unreported results, t-tests fail to reject the
null of the equality of means and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests fail to reject the null of equality
of distributions for these characteristics across the two groups.
– Figure 2: Issuer Characteristic Kernel Densities –
4 Results
Firms near salient Debt/EBITDA thresholds face a higher expected marginal benefit from
improving on this dimension (i.e., reducing the ratio) because crossing a threshold increases
the likelihood of getting a credit rating upgrade.13 Improving this likelihood gives managers
incentives to take actions to increase EBITDA and/or decrease debt. In this section, I
exploit the presence of multiple salient Debt/EBITDA thresholds to identify the effect of
credit rating criteria on firms’ R&D and SG&A investment policies and their subsequent
13In later tests, I explicitly show that crossing a salient threshold leads to an average rating upgrade of
approximately one-fourth of a rating (see Table 9).
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performance.
4.1 The Effect of Rating Criteria on Investment
Figure 3 is a graphical depiction of the main results. It plots the probability that a firm
reduces their R&D investment as a function of their Debt/EBITDA ratio one year prior to
getting rated. I group firms based on their proximity to the salient thresholds (H-I Zones
as outlined in Section 2) and plot the mean probability of reducing investment within that
group. The alternating nature of the plot highlights the differential behavior of firms that are
near salient thresholds from those that are not. For example, about 56% of issuers near the
2.0 threshold reduce their R&D expenditures during the year prior to getting rated, while
about 40% and 47% in the adjacent comparison groups not near the threshold (for example,
Debt/EBITDA ≈ 1.9 and 2.3) do so. This pattern emerges around each salient threshold
throughout the Debt/EBITDA spectrum. The pattern for SG&A is similar, though the
magnitude of the differences is smaller (not shown).
– Figure 3: Investment Policies along Debt/EBITDA –
Table 3 aggregates the treatment group (H-I Zone issuers) and control group and reports
the average probability of reducing their R&D or SG&A investment. The first column
indicates that roughly half of the firms in the full sample reduce each type of investment
in the year leading up to getting rated. The next two columns highlight the difference
in investment behavior between those firms near a salient threshold and those that are not.
About 64% of H-I Zone firms reduced R&D investment as compared to 45% of control firms.
The corresponding figures for reducing SG&A are about 56% for H-I Zone firms compared
to 51% for the controls. The results indicate that issuers in an H-I Zone, which face the
higher expected marginal benefit of improving their Debt/EBITDA ratio, are about 42% (19
15
percentage points) more likely to reduce R&D and about 10% (5 percentage points) more
likely to reduce SG&A expenditures in the year prior to issuance.
– Table 3: Cut Investment – Mean Differences –
To ensure that any residual differences in the two groups along observable dimensions or
time-specific factors are not driving the differences in investment decisions, I estimate the
following model.
1{Cut [R&D,SG&A]i,t→t+4} = α + ρ(H-I Zone)it +
∑
βXit + qt + εit (1)
I regress an indicator of whether the issuer cuts investment (R&D, then SG&A) on the
issuer’s proximity to a salient threshold. I use an indicator of investment reduction for the
main specifications because the magnitude of the reduction is likely a function of the distance
to the threshold. Firms closest to the threshold have the strongest incentives to alter their
behavior, but have to reduce investment by a smaller amount to achieve their goal. Thus,
an indicator variable more sharply captures the change in behavior. I also include a vector
of firm characteristics (Xit) to control for other potential firm-level drivers of investment
and year-quarter fixed effects (qt) to capture any economy-wide fluctuations that could drive
investment decisions. I also include specifications with industry fixed effects to ensure that
some unobserved industry factor that is correlated with both firms’ pre-issuance investments
and their proximity to a salient threshold is not driving the results. I estimate regression
equation (1) using a linear probability model14 and cluster all standard errors at the firm
14I present results from estimations using a linear probability model because it does not suffer from
the incidental parameters problem in models with fixed effects (conditional logit models rely on stronger
assumptions for consistency; see, e.g., Wooldridge (2002)), its parameter estimates are consistent in the face
of various forms of heteroskedasticity, and the ease of interpretations of the partial effect estimates. The
results are similar using a logistic regression model.
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level.15 Table 4 presents the results.
– Table 4: Cutting Investment Baseline –
The coefficient estimates on H-I Zone mirror the results of the simple group mean anal-
ysis presented in Table 3. Issuers near a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold one year prior
to issuance are about 19 percentage points more likely to reduce their R&D expenditures
(Columns 1-2) and 6 percentage points more likely to reduce SG&A (Columns 3-4). The
striking similarity of the point estimates from the regression analysis in Table 4 to the sim-
ple differences presented in Table 3 supports the notion that the intermittent nature of
salient thresholds creates a balanced comparison between firms receiving the high-incentive
treatment and the control firms.
The results above highlight the average treatment effect of receiving the high-incentive
treatment. The following test exploits heterogeneity in the strength of the treatment by
modeling the decision to reduce investment as a function of the issuing firm’s distance to
the next better Debt/EBITDA threshold. Issuers closest to a salient threshold face the
highest expected marginal benefit of an improvement and also the lowest cost because only
a relatively small movement is necessary to improve bins. Thus the likelihood of reducing
investment should be a decreasing function of distance to the next highest threshold. To
test this notion, I estimate the following specification, where dist is the distance to the next
highest bin (likewise measured a year prior to getting a bond rated) and dist2 is its square.
Columns (1)-(2) in Table 5 present the results.
15I find similar results when computing White standard errors or clustering by firm, time, or industry.
The relative invariance of the standard error estimates across differing clustering structures indicates that
any autocorrelation in the right-hand side variables and/or residuals is likely very small and that there is
not a meaningful time-specific correlation effect after controlling for year-quarter fixed effects.
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1{Cut Invi,t→t+4} = α + δ(dist)it + γ(dist2)it +
∑
βXit + qt + εit (2)
– Table 5: Cutting Investment – Continuous Measures –
These results indicate that issuers closest to a threshold and thus have the highest incen-
tives to take actions to improve their ratio are most likely to respond by reducing investment.
Figure 4 uses the coefficient estimates to plot the change in probability of investment reduc-
tion. Similar to the baseline results above, the results are stronger for R&D investments.
– Figure 4: ∆Prob(Cut investment) as a continuous function of distance to a threshold –
The next tests examine a continuous measure of changes in investment rather than a
discrete outcome of whether firms cuts their investments. Specifically, I re-estimate the
baseline regression specification (1) using the percent change in investment policy as the
dependent variable. Columns (3)-(4) of Table 5 present the results. The point estimates
on H-I Zone indicate that the average firm receiving the high-incentive treatment reduces
its investments in R&D and SG&A by about 10% and 3%, respectively. For the median
firm with Debt/EBITDA ∈ [1.25, 1.50], this degree of investment reduction, ceteris paribus,
translates to an approximate Debt/EBITDA ratio improvement of 0.07. The effect progres-
sively increases with each Debt/EBITDA bin, with the median firm with Debt/EBITDA
∈ [4.0, 5.0] achieving an improvement of approximately 0.17.
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4.2 The Effect When Credit Spreads Are High
The incentives to cross thresholds should be stronger when firms’ benefit of improving
their credit rating is higher. The economic benefit from an increase in credit rating is greater
when the sensitivity of yield spreads to credit quality is high. That is, in high-credit-spread
times, the expected benefit of crossing a salient threshold is higher than in low-credit-spread
times, and the effects documented above should be stronger. To test this hypothesis, I
include in the baseline regression specification an interaction of H-I Zone with an indicator,
High Spread, that equals one when the Baa-Aaa yield spread exceeds the sample period
median.
1{Cut Invi,t→t+4} = α + ρ(H-I Zone)it + ψ(H-I Zone)it × (High Spread)t
+
∑
βXit + qt + εit (3)
While there are other differences in the economy that could lead to differential firm in-
vestment policies between these two regimes (for example, lower credit spreads could indicate
more favorable investment opportunities), the level of such effects will be absorbed by the
year-quarter fixed effects–the identifying variation is still in the cross section. Along with
the level effects of other macroeconomic shocks, year-quarter fixed effects absorb any level
effects of the credit spread on issuers’ investment decisions. Table 6 presents the results with
Columns (1) and (3) presenting the baseline results from earlier for comparison.
– Table 6: Cutting Investment – High Credit Spread –
For both R&D and SG&A, the point estimate on the interaction of H-I Zone and High
Spread indicates that issuers near salient thresholds are even more likely to respond to
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incentives to reduce these investments when the economic benefit of a better rating is the
higher. Compared to issuers not near a salient threshold a year prior to issuance, issuers in
the H-I Zones are about 24 percentage points more likely to reduce R&D expenditures and
11 percentage points more likely to reduce SG&A expenditures.
Overall, these results show that issuers with higher incentives to improve their appearance
on the CRA-emphasized dimension of Debt/EBITDA ratio are substantially more likely to
reduce spending on real investment activities as a means to that end. Further, the likelihood
of this response is stronger when the yield spreads between ratings is large and the economic
benefit from crossing a salient threshold is greater.
4.3 Future Innovation and Profitability
The evidence thus far documents differential changes in investments for firms near salient
Debt/EBITDA thresholds as compared to observationally similar control firms. This section
investigates whether these firms experience subsequent declines in innovation and profitabil-
ity. I use the issuer’s performance as of one year prior to issuance as the baseline for
comparison and construct an indicator variable equal to one when the firm’s performance τ
years after bond issuance experiences a decline relative to their benchmark and estimate the
following specification.
1{Perfi,t+τ < Perfi,t−1} = α + ρ(H-I Zone)i,t−1 +
∑
βXi,t−1 + qt + εit (4)
Investment in innovation is an important driver of long-run firm value, but its intangible
and long-term nature make it particularly vulnerable to short-term cost cutting. The next
tests use future patent productivity to measure the consequences of these reductions for
innovation output. I use a per annum raw count of new patents and the patent citation
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counts over the two years prior to bond issuance as a benchmark for the firm’s innovation
output. To capture the long-run nature of investment on innovation, I follow the literature
(see, e.g., Cornaggia, Mao, Tian, and Wolfe, 2013; Seru, 2013) and examine the average
innovation output over τ years following the event of interest (bond issuance). Panels A and
B of Table 7 present the results.16
– Table 7: Future Declines in Innovation and Profitability –
While the sign of the estimated coefficients on H-I Zone in Panel A suggest that these
firms are more likely to produce less patents in the future, the point estimate is statistically
different from zero only in the first year following bond issuance. This result indicates that
firms in the H-I Zone do see declines in the raw quantity of patents produced, but the
effects are relatively short-lived. Panel B presents estimates considering patent citations,
which is widely considered a sharper measure of the quality and impact of innovation. These
estimates provide evidence that H-I Zone issuers are more likely to experience a persistent
future decline in innovation. With about 20% of the sample experiencing declines in this
measure, the point estimate of about 0.05 indicates that these firms are roughly 25% more
likely to see innovation declines that observationally similar firms not near a salient threshold.
Together with the results of the tests of raw counts, this suggests though there is not a large
decrease in the quantity of patents produced, firms with stronger incentives for improvement
in Debt/EBITDA in the short run have a considerably higher likelihood of declines in the
quality of their innovation output.
I next examine future operating performance and profitability. To measure operating
performance, I use operating income scaled by assets (ROA) as suggested by Barber and
Lyon (1996). This ratio measures the productivity of the firm’s assets excluding items such
16As is typically the case in exercise such as this, the number of observations drop as the time horizon
under examination increases.
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as interest expense, special items, income taxes, and minority interest. Panel C in Table 7
presents the results. The coefficient estimates on H-I Zone indicate that issuers near salient
Debt/EBITDA thresholds one year prior to issuance are about 5 percentage points (10%,
based on the sample mean of about 0.50) more likely to experience persistent future declines
in ROA compared to observationally similar issuers that are not.
In Panel D, I consider return on equity (ROE) to focus on future performance from the
perspective of shareholders. Computed as the ratio of net income to shareholder equity,
this ratio measures how much profit the firm generates with the money shareholders have
invested. The estimates indicate that H-I Zone firms are more likely to have lower ROE for
three years following bond issuance.
4.4 Future Tobin’s Q
The above results highlight some important long-term consequences in terms of depressed
innovation and profitability. To more directly assess the firm value implications, I extend
the above analysis to examine future changes in industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q (QIA) for H-
I Zone firms compared to the control firms not near a salient threshold. I compute QIAi
by subtracting the SIC 2-digit industry median QIndustryt from firm Qit. Since the sample
is well balanced between the treatment and control firms, I begin by computing a simple
difference-in-difference estimate. Panel A of Table 8 presents the results.
– Table 8: Future Tobin’s Q –
The first column shows both the treatment and control firms have QIA = 0.19. Each
following column computes ∆QIA = QIAt+τ − QIAt for each group for four years following
issuance. The difference-in-differences estimates indicate that H-I Zone firms have lower QIA
in the years following issuance as compared to observationally similar control firms. While
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the control firms experience a modest increase in QIA, the differential performance between
the groups is driven more by the falling QIA of the treatment firms. Based on a sample
mean of 1.64, the treatment effect of 0.03 to 0.06 in post-issuance years 1 to 4 translates to a
1.8-3.6% decline in Tobin’s Q, though the estimate for year 3 is not statistically significant.
I next turn to regression analysis to make sure that any residual differences between the
two groups on observable dimensions or time effects are not driving the results. I estimate
the following specification:
QIAi,t+τ = α + ρ(H-I Zone)it +
∑
βXit + qt + εit (5)
Panel B of Table 8 presents the results. The regression estimates present a similar picture
to the differences computed in Panel A; H-I Zone firms experience a decline in Tobin’s Q of
about 0.03 to 0.05 relative to control firms.
In sum, reducing investment in R&D and SG&A provides the benefit of an improved
Debt/EBITDA in the short term, but it ultimately comes at the cost of reduced innovation,
profitability, and long-run value. The results in this section support my main claim that firms
respond to credit rating criteria by shifting resources away from value-relevant dimensions
to appear strong on the dimensions emphasized by CRAs.
5 Additional Tests
In this section, I examine how credit ratings and at-issuance bond yields respond to the
changes in investment behavior documented above. I then examine the effects of rating
criteria on investment for bond issuances that are most likely to be planned in advance.
Finally, I show that the results are not an artifact of firms cutting investment in response to
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covenant violations.
5.1 The Market Response to Changes in Investment Behavior
To test whether crossing a Debt/EBITDA threshold is associated with better ratings,
I regress changes in credit ratings between one year prior to getting rated and the bond
issuance on changes in firm characteristics that are important drivers of default risk (e.g.,
see Shumway, 2001) and changes in Debt/EBITDA ratio.
∆Ratingi,t→t+5 = α + φ(Improve bin)i,t→t+4 +
∑
β∆Xi,t→t+4 + εi,t
The variable of interest is a dummy variable (Improve bin) equal to one when the firm has
crossed a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold. The coefficient estimate on this variable indicates
the additional boost in credit rating a firm receives from crossing a salient threshold above
and beyond the general effect of reducing Debt/EBITDA. For example, this estimates the
benefit an issuer gets from decreasing Debt/EBITDA from 2.05 to 1.95 (crossing 2.0) above
and beyond the effect of an improvement of Debt/EBITDA from 1.9 to 1.8 or 2.2 to 2.1.
Columns (1-2) in Table 9 present the results.17
– Table 9: Crossing Thresholds and Credit Ratings –
Column (1) presents the results without including the threshold-crossing indicator. Con-
sistent with previous literature, firms with higher stock returns, increases in profitability, and
decreases in leverage are more likely to be upgraded. Consistent with intuition, decreases
in Debt/EBITDA are also positively related to credit rating upgrades. Column (2) presents
the full specification. The coefficient estimate on Improve bin of 0.26 indicates that crossing
17These estimations require the issuer have an S&P rating five months prior to issuance, which leads to a
roughly 12% reduction in sample size.
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a salient threshold is associated with a upgrade of about one-fourth of a rating. While it is
sufficient that managers believe that improving Debt/EBITDA bin is associated with better
ratings, these results show that firms benefit from crossing a salient threshold.
If the CRAs observe that a firm advances to a better Debt/EBITDA bin, but view the
behavior that facilitated the move as a poor signal of creditworthiness, then the ratings may
not react to the firm crossing a salient threshold. To test this supposition, I regress the
changes in credit rating in the periods leading up to bond issuance on fundamental drivers
of credit ratings, a variable that indicates an improvement in Debt/EBITDA bin (Improve
bin), an indicator of whether the firm cut investment (Cut Inv), and the interaction of the
latter two terms in the following specification.
∆Rating = α + φ(Improve bin) + ρ(Cut Inv) + θ(Improve bin× Cut Inv) + Γ∆X + ε
(6)
Columns (3-4) of Table 9 present the results. For both R&D and SG&A, firms that
are reduce their level of investments are less likely to receive an upgrade. However, the
point estimates on the interaction terms (θ̂) indicate the firms that cut investments and
crossed a salient threshold were not assigned significantly different ratings than those that
cut investments but did not cross a salient threshold. Next, I examine whether at-issuance
bond yields respond to this behavior.
If bond market participants observe this behavior and view it as a negative signal, they
will demand a higher yield on the bonds. To test this hypothesis, I regress the bond yield
at issuance on variables that reflect credit risk including dummy variables for each rating
class, Debt/EBITDA bin, and year-quarter fixed effects. Similar to the spirit of the previous
test, I include an indicator of whether the firm recently improved their Debt/EBITDA bin,
whether the firm recently cut investment, and the interaction of these two variables. If bond
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buyers identify and penalize this behavior, the point estimate on the interaction term will
be positive to indicate a higher demanded yield. Table 10 presents the results.18
– Table 10: Crossing Thresholds and Yields –
The point estimates on the interaction terms are not statistically different from zero.
These results indicate that firms that cut investment and cross a salient threshold do not
receive significantly different yield on their bonds at offering beyond the effects the actions
may have on credit rating. Overall, the lack of price response is consistent with the no-
tion that investors rely on credit ratings and that changes in investment policies are not
unambiguously interpreted by the bond market. These findings are consistent with those of
Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2013), who provide evidence that stock market investors do
not differentiate between high quality and low quality R&D investment.
5.2 Subsample Analysis and Robustness
Refinancing Bonds
An underlying assumption of the tests in the paper is that management knows in advance
that there is a financing need. In anticipation of bond issuance, management has some time
to take actions to conform to the standards of the CRAs. While issuing a bond is a major
financial event for most firms and is typically planned well in advance, there are also cases
when firms may issue bonds very quickly to fund, for example, a strategic acquisition. If such
an opportunity arises unexpectedly, a firm does not have time to take actions to improve
their appearance and simply issues the bond in their current state. The presence of such
observations in the data adds noise to the estimations and could mask the true effect. The
following test focuses on a subset of observations where management is more likely to be
18Some observations are dropped because of missing yield data.
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planning the issuance in advance. Specifically, I focus on debt issuances that are more likely
to be refinancing transactions by computing a ratio of the amount of debt in current liabilities
(debt due within a year) the quarter before issuance to the eventual bond issuance amount.
Because of the relatively large amount of debt due soon, firms with a higher ratio are more
likely to be planning in advance of their financing need. Table 11A presents the results of
the base specification for the subset of observation where
debt in current liabilitiest−1Q
bond amountt
≥ 1.
– Table 11: Refinancing Bonds & Covenant Violations –
For this subsample of observations, the point estimates of the coefficient on H-I Zone is
greater than the estimates from the base specification for each investment category. This
finding supports the notion that firms that foresee an approaching financing need are more
likely to take actions to strengthen their appearance leading up to getting a bond rated.
Covenant Violations
In addition to being a key metric of creditworthiness in the eyes of CRAs, the Debt/EBITDA
ratio is also used in financial covenants in bank loan contracts. When borrowers violate
loan covenants, they are in technical default and creditors then have the right to accelerate
the loan. This gives creditors a great deal of influence on the actions of the firm during
renegotiation. Chava and Roberts (2008) show that capital expenditures decline following
violations of financial covenants. In light of their results, a possible concern may be that
firms near salient thresholds happen to be firms that have recently violated covenants and
the findings in this paper are an artifact of the effects of covenant violations on investment.
To rule out this possibility, I augment my dataset with covenant violation data generously
provided by Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012). Their data record whether a firm is in violation of
a financial covenant violation data during a given quarter for Compustat non-financial firms
from 1996-2009. Because the data begin in 1996 and my sample begins in 1990, these tests
have fewer observations than the baseline results.
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For each investment variable, I estimate two specifications to examine whether covenant
violations drive the findings and present the results in Panel B of Table 11. First, I estimate
the base regression specification (1) including an indicator variable, Cov Violation, equal to
one if the issuer breaches a covenant during the periods leading up to getting rated (columns
1 and 3). Second, I estimate the base specification excluding the observations for which Cov
Violation equals one (columns 2 and 4).
The coefficient estimate for Cov Violation is positive for each investment type indicating
that firms in violation of a covenant are more likely to reduce R&D and SG&A investments,
but the estimates are not statistically significant. Turning to the coefficient of interest in this
paper, the size and statistical significance for coefficient estimates for H-I Zone are virtually
unaffected by covenant violation considerations.
6 Conclusion
Credit ratings have emerged as a key mechanism to bridge the fundamental information
asymmetry problem between firms and investors. Ratings give better access to debt markets
for firms, expand the universe of investment opportunities for investors, and are deeply
interwoven into financial regulation. Because credit ratings are an important factor in firms’
level of access to and cost of debt capital, firms have incentives to take potentially costly
actions to improve their rating.
I use an institutional feature of the credit rating process that generates cross-sectional
variation in the incentives of firms to improve on a specific dimension that CRAs emphasize:
Debt/EBITDA ratio. I show that firms that are near salient Debt/EBITDA thresholds–
effectively receiving a high-incentive “treatment” to improve on this dimension–respond by
reducing R&D and SG&A investments in the periods leading up to getting a bond rated.
Further, I show that these firms are more likely to experience declines in innovation output,
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profitability, and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q in the years following bond issuance
than observationally similar control firms. These results highlight an important cost of arms-
length financing and suggest that the benefits of policies requiring increased transparency
and disclosure of credit rating criteria should be carefully balanced against the corporate
behavioral distortions they may induce.19
19See the “Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006” and Title XI, Subtitle C – Improvements to the
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Table A.1: Variable Definitions
This table identifies the data sources and describes the construction of variables used in the analysis. Com-
pany financial data are from Compustat, returns are from CRSP, and bond data are from the fixed income
securities database (FISD). For firm financial data, quarterly data are used if the firm reports at that
frequency.
Variable Definition
Assets Total assets [atq].
Leverage Total debt [dlcq + dlttq] / assets [atq].
Tobin’s Q (Assets [atq] + market value of equity [prccq * cshoq] - common equity [ceqq]
- deferred taxes [txditcq]) / assets [atq].
Debt/EBITDA Total debt [dlcq + dlttq] / trailing four quarters EBITDA [oibdpq].
Return on Assets Trailing four quarters of EBITDA [oibdpq] / lagged assets [atq].
Return on Equity Trailing four quarters net income [niq] / lagged common equity [ceqq]
Cash flow Trailing four quarters of income plus depreciation [ibq + dpq] / lagged assets
[atq].
R&D Research and development expenditures [xrd] / lagged total assets [atq].
SG&A Selling, general, and administrative expenditures [xsga] / lagged total assets
[atq].
Stock Return Equity stock return over the past year.
Bond Yield Yield to maturity of the bond at issuance. When multiple bonds are issued in
the same quarter, this is computed as the dollar-weighted yield of the issuances.
Bond Amount Amount of issuance in millions. When multiple bonds are issued in the same
quarter, this is computed as the sum issuances.
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Figure 1: The Distribution of Debt/EBITDA One Year Prior to Getting Rated
This figure presents a kernel density of the sample Debt/EBITDA ratio one year prior to getting
rated. The shaded areas indicate regions where issuers are approaching a salient Debt/EBITDA
threshold and thus have a high incentive to improve along this dimension, as described in Section
2. In the empirical tests, I refer to the shaded regions as high-incentive zones (H-I Zones).
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Figure 2: Issuer Characteristics by Whether the Firm Is in the High-Incentive Zone
This figure presents kernel densities of the sample separately for those near salient Debt/EBITDA
thresholds (H-I Zone=1) and those that are not. Table A.1 in the Appendix outlines the construc-
tion of the variables.
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Figure 3: Proximity to a Salient Debt/EBITDA Threshold and Subsequent R&D
Investment
This figure presents the mean issuer’s decision to reduce R&D investment policies during the year
leading up to getting a bond rated, based on issuer’s proximity to a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold
one year prior to getting rated. Each bin illustrates the mean of the binary behavior response of
the issuers in that bin with regard to reducing investment (corresponding to a value of one) or
not reducing investment (corresponding to a value of zero). The darker bins represent issuers
near a salient threshold (e.g., 2.0, 2.5, etc.), which I refer to as high-incentive zones (H-I Zones)
throughout the paper, and the lighter bins represent issuers who are not (denoted in the figure with
a “C” to represent Control).
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Figure 4: Likelihood of Cutting Investment as a Function of Distance to a Threshold
This figure presents the plot of the change in likelihood of cutting R&D and SG&A investment
policies as a function of the issuer’s distance to a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold a year prior to
getting a bond rated as estimated in Table 5. For example, 0.1 on the x-axis represents firms with
Debt/EBITDA = (2.0 + 0.1=) 2.1, 2.6, 3.1, etc.
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Table 1: Business and Financial Risk Profile Matrix
This table presents excerpts from the credit ratings methodologies published by major credit rating agencies.
Panel A presents Standard & Poor’s Corporate Credit Rating Methodology Business Risk/Financial Risk
Profile Matrix (Standard and Poor’s, 2012) and Panel B presents the Debt/EBITDA to credit rating mapping
for the global steel industry by Moody’s (Moody’s Investor Service, 2012).
Panel A: Standard & Poor’s Business Risk/Financial Risk Matrix
Financial Risk Profile
Minimal Modest Intermediate Significant Aggressive Highly Leveraged
Debt/EBITDA < 1.5 1.5-2.0 2.0-3.0 3.0-4.0 4.0-5.0 > 5.0
Business Risk Profile
Excellent AAA/AA+ AA A A- BBB –
Strong AA A A- BBB BB BB-
Satisfactory A- BBB+ BBB BB+ BB- B+
Fair – BBB- BB+ BB BB- B
Weak – – BB BB- B+ B-
Vulnerable – – – B+ B B- or below
Panel B: Moody’s Example Rating Grid from the Global Steel Industry Methodology
Debt/EBITDA <0.75 0.75-1.25 1.25-2.0 2.0-3.0 3.0-4.0 4.0-5.5 5.5-7.5 >7.5
Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca
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Table 2: Sample Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the sample. All variables are winsorized at 1% prior to regression
analysis. Table A.1 in the Appendix outlines the construction of the control variables.
mean sd p25 p50 p75 count
Debt/EBITDA 2.47 1.08 1.59 2.24 3.22 1770
log(Assets) 8.32 1.62 7.19 8.31 9.54 1770
Book Leverage 0.35 0.14 0.25 0.33 0.42 1770
Tobin’s Q 1.64 0.72 1.15 1.43 1.91 1770
Cash flow/Assets 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.14 1770
log(Firm Age) 3.39 0.66 2.94 3.61 3.89 1770
Return on Assets 0.16 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.19 1770
Return on Equity 0.18 0.43 0.08 0.16 0.24 1770
R&D/Assets 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 807
SG&A/Assets 0.22 0.20 0.08 0.16 0.29 1770
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Table 3: Proximity to Salient Thresholds and Investment – Difference in Means
This table presents the percentage of firms that reduce R&D or SG&A investment policies during the year
leading up to getting a bond rated. Column (1) presents overall sample means, Columns (2) and (3) present
mean investment decisions for those not near a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold (H-I Zone = No) and those
that are near a salient threshold (H-I Zone = Yes). Columns (4) and (5) present the difference in means
for these two groups in percentage points (pps) and percent difference. H-I Zone is a dummy variable equal
to one if the issuer is near a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold one year prior to getting a bond rated (see
Section 2 for details).
Overall H-I Zone Difference
Investment P(Cut Investment) No Yes pps %
R&D 51.4% 44.9% 63.5% 18.6∗∗∗ 41.5%
SG&A 52.4% 50.5% 55.5% 5.0∗∗ 9.9%
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4: Proximity to Salient Thresholds and Investment
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of an indicator of whether the firm reduces R&D (Columns
(1)-(2)) or SG&A (Columns (3)-(4))investment during the year leading up to getting a bond rated on the
issuer’s proximity to a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold one year prior to getting a bond rated and firm
characteristics. H-I Zone is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is near a salient Debt/EBITDA
threshold one year prior to getting a bond rated (see Section 2 for details). Table A.1 in the Appendix
outlines the construction of the control variables. Columns (2) and (4) include SIC 2 digit industry code
dummies. All standard errors are clustered by issuer.
Cut R&D Cut SG&A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H-I Zone 0.184∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.062∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02)
log(Assets) -0.000 -0.007 0.015 0.009
(0.98) (0.69) (0.21) (0.49)
Tobin’s Q -0.028 -0.038 0.035∗ 0.022
(0.45) (0.33) (0.09) (0.32)
Cash flow -0.842∗∗ -0.871∗∗ -0.029 0.002
(0.05) (0.04) (0.89) (0.99)
log(Debt/EBITDA) -0.082 -0.136 0.030 0.027
(0.35) (0.12) (0.55) (0.62)
log(Firm Age) 0.067∗ 0.080∗∗ -0.009 -0.031
(0.07) (0.05) (0.69) (0.24)
Industry FE No Yes No Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 807 807 1770 1770
R2 0.186 0.236 0.097 0.129
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Tests Using Continuous Variables
Columns (1)-(2) present OLS estimates from regressions of an indicator of whether the firm reduces R&D or
SG&A during the year leading up to getting a bond rated on the issuer’s proximity to a salient Debt/EBITDA
threshold one year prior to getting a bond rated and firm characteristics. The dependent variables for columns
(3)-(4) are the percent change in the relevant investment policy during the year leading up to getting a bond
rated. dist equals the distance between the firm’s Debt/EBITDA and the adjacent better threshold (e.g.,
for Debt/EBITDA = 2.1, dist = 0.1) and dist2 is its square. H-I Zone is a dummy variable equal to one if
the issuer is near a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold one year prior to getting a bond rated (see Section 2
for details). Table A.1 in the Appendix outlines the construction of the control variables. All specifications
include SIC 2 digit industry code dummies. All standard errors are clustered by issuer.
1{Cut Investment} %∆ Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
R&D SG&A R&D SG&A






log(Assets) -0.004 0.010 -0.002 -0.01∗∗∗
(0.81) (0.44) (0.85) (0.01)
Tobin’s Q -0.060 0.041∗∗ 0.032 -0.019∗∗
(0.10) (0.04) (0.21) (0.03)
Cash flow -1.025∗∗ -0.003 0.108 0.183∗
(0.02) (0.67) (0.24) (0.06)
log(Debt/EBITDA) 0.041 0.101∗ -0.003 -0.057∗∗∗
(0.70) (0.07) (0.95) (0.01)
log(Firm Age) 0.083∗∗ -0.028 -0.027 0.015
(0.04) (0.28) (0.33) (0.15)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 807 1770 807 1770
R2 0.211 0.129 0.306 0.146
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Proximity to Salient Thresholds and Investment When Credit Spreads Are
High
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of an indicator of whether the firm reduces R&D (Columns
(1)-(2)) or SG&A expenditures (Columns (3)-(4)) during the year leading up to getting a bond rated on
the issuer’s proximity to a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold one year prior to getting a bond rated and firm
characteristics. H-I Zone is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is near a salient Debt/EBITDA
threshold one year prior to getting a bond rated (see Section 2 for details), and High Spread is a dummy
variable equal to one for time periods when the Baa-Aaa spread exceeds the median for the sample period.
Table A.1 in the Appendix outlines the construction of the control variables. Columns (1) and (3) reproduce
results from Table 4 for comparison. All specifications include SIC 2 digit industry code dummies. All
standard errors are clustered by issuer.
Cut R&D Cut SG&A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H-I Zone 0.188∗∗∗ 0.007 0.062∗∗ -0.013
(0.00) (0.93) (0.02) (0.78)
H-I Zone * High Spread 0.241∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗
(0.01) (0.04)
Controls, Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 807 807 1770 1770
R2 0.236 0.246 0.129 0.132
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Future Declines in Operating Performance and Innovation Output
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of an indicator of future performance declines on whether
the issuer is near a salient threshold one year prior to issuing a bond and a vector of firm controls.
1{Perft+τ < Perft} = α+ ρ(H-I Zone)it +
∑
βXit + qt + εit
The dependent variables in Panels A and B are dummy variables equal to one when the issuers average
patent productivity, measured as number of patents and citation-weighted patents, respectively, in the τ
years after bond issuance is lower than its average patent productivity one year prior to getting a bond
rated. The dependent variable in Panels C and D are dummy variables equal to one when the issuer’s ROA
(operating income/assets) or ROE (net income/shareholder equity) in τ years is lower than its respective
value one year prior to getting a bond rated. H-I Zone is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is near
a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold one year prior to getting a bond rated (see Section 2 for details). The
vector of controls includes log(Assets), Tobin’s Q, Cash flow/Assets, log(Debt/EBITDA) and SIC 2 digit
industry code dummy variables. R&D/Assets is included as a control in Panels A and B. Table A.1 in the
Appendix outlines the construction of the control variables. All standard errors are clustered by issuer.
Panel A: P(Lower Future Number of Patents)
+1yr +2yr +3yr +4yr
H-I Zone 0.085∗ 0.024 0.006 0.031
(0.07) (0.57) (0.90) (0.47)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 557 548 496 450
R2 0.161 0.227 0.302 0.323
Panel B: P(Lower Future Patent Citation)
+1yr +2yr +3yr +4yr
H-I Zone 0.041 0.056∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.052∗
(0.16) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 557 548 496 450
R2 0.454 0.563 0.571 0.521
Panel C: P(Lower Future ROA [operating income/assets])
+1yr +2yr +3yr +4yr
H-I Zone 0.055∗∗ 0.042∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.01) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1691 1528 1429 1205
R2 0.162 0.180 0.199 0.219
Panel D: P(Lower Future ROE [net income/shareholder equity])
+1yr +2yr +3yr +4yr
H-I Zone 0.045∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.051∗ 0.036
(0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.20)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1691 1528 1429 1205
R2 0.177 0.195 0.171 0.169
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: Future Changes in Tobin’s Q
This table presents estimates of changes in future industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q (QIA). Panel A presents the
difference in QIA for the treatment (HI-Zone) and control firms for four years following issuance, followed by
the difference in differences across these groups. Panel B presents OLS estimates from regressions of future
QIA on whether the issuer is near a salient threshold one year prior to issuing a bond and a vector of firm
controls: QIAi,t+τ = α + ρ(H-I Zone)it +
∑
βXit + qt + εit. Q
IA is the firm’s Tobin’s Q minus the industry
median Tobin’s Q for that time period. H-I Zone is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is near a
salient Debt/EBITDA threshold one year prior to getting a bond rated (see Section 2 for details). Table A.1
in the Appendix outlines the construction of the variables. All regression specifications include SIC 2-digit
industry dummy variables and all standard errors are clustered by issuer.
Panel A: Future Changes in Q – Raw Differences
∆QIA
Baseline QIA +1yr +2yr +3yr +4yr
Control (H-I Zone=0 ) 0.19 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01
Treatment (H-I Zone=1 ) 0.19 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05
Difference-in-Differences 0.00 -0.03** -0.04** -0.03 -0.06**
p-value (0.97) (0.03) (0.04) (0.15) (0.04)
Panel B: Future Q – Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
+1yr +2yr +3yr +4yr
HI-Zone -0.028∗ -0.043∗∗ -0.029 -0.048∗
(0.06) (0.02) (0.18) (0.07)
log(Assets) -0.001 0.004 0.007 0.009
(0.95) (0.73) (0.59) (0.56)
Industry-Adjusted Q 0.831∗∗∗ 0.753∗∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
log(Debt/EBITDA) 0.014 -0.014 -0.049 -0.115
(0.74) (0.79) (0.39) (0.14)
log(Firm Age) 0.002 0.012 0.019 0.008
(0.89) (0.57) (0.48) (0.80)
Leverage -0.054 0.018 0.123 0.178
(0.54) (0.89) (0.45) (0.41)
ROA 0.765∗∗ 0.659 0.229 0.307
(0.02) (0.11) (0.64) (0.65)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1691 1528 1429 1205
R2 0.767 0.664 0.590 0.461
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 9: Crossing Thresholds, Cutting Investment and Credit Rating Improvement
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of changes in the issuer’s credit rating from one year prior
to getting rated and bond issuance on the key drivers of corporate credit ratings. 1{Improve Debt/EBITDA
bin} is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer crossed a salient threshold into a better Debt/EBITDA
bin during the year leading up to getting a bond rated. Cut R&D, SG&A are dummy variables equal to
one if the issuer cut the respective investment in the year prior to getting rated. Table A.1 in the Appendix
outlines the construction of the control variables. Include SIC 2 digit industry code dummies. All standard
errors are clustered by issuer.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Rating ∆Rating ∆Rating ∆Rating
Stock Return 0.339∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
∆log(Assets) 0.288 0.313 0.312 0.337∗
(0.14) (0.11) (0.39) (0.10)
∆Leverage -2.480∗∗∗ -2.483∗∗∗ -2.540∗∗ -2.464∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
∆Profitability 0.599∗∗ 0.505∗∗ 1.658 0.307
(0.04) (0.04) (0.20) (0.14)
∆Debt/EBITDA -0.061∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗ -0.064 -0.053∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.23) (0.01)








1{Improve bin} * Cut SG&A 0.053
(0.58)
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1498 1498 687 1498
R2 0.236 0.252 0.311 0.263
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 10: Crossing Thresholds, Cutting Investment and Yields
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of the yield of newly issued bonds on the key drivers of
default risk. For firms that issue multiple bonds in the same quarter, I use a dollar-weighted average yield of
the bonds. 1{Improve Debt/EBITDA bin} is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer crossed a salient
threshold into a better Debt/EBITDA bin during the year leading up to getting a bond rated. Cut R&D,
SG&A are dummy variables equal to one if the issuer cut the respective investment in the year prior to
getting rated. Table A.1 in the Appendix outlines the construction of the control variables. Include SIC 2
digit industry code dummy variables, dummy variables for each credit rating, and dummy variables for each
salient Debt/EBITDA bin (described in Section 2. All standard errors are clustered by issuer.
(1) (2) (3)
Yield Yield Yield
Log(Assets) -0.146∗∗ -0.131∗ -0.162∗∗
(0.03) (0.09) (0.02)
Leverage 0.027 -0.675 0.083
(0.96) (0.33) (0.88)
Profitability -2.978∗∗∗ -2.998 -2.917∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.22) (0.00)
Stock Return -0.028 -0.755∗∗∗ 0.011
(0.88) (0.01) (0.95)
log(Bond Amount) -0.098 -0.276∗∗ -0.067
(0.35) (0.02) (0.53)








1{Improve bin} * Cut SG&A -0.125
(0.48)
Debt/EBITDA Bin FE Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1140 551 1096
R2 0.619 0.685 0.626
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 11: Additional Tests
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of an indicator of whether the firm reduces R&D or
SG&A expenditures during the year leading up to getting a bond rated on the issuer’s proximity to a salient
Debt/EBITDA threshold one year prior to getting a bond rated and firm characteristics. Panel A presents
estimates using the subsample of bonds that are more likely to be used for refinancing existing debt. These
are observations where the debt in current liabilities one quarter prior to issuance is at least as large as
the size of the bond issuance. Panel B presents the baseline regression, controlling for whether the issuer is
in violation of a financial covenant during the year leading up to getting a bond rated (Cov Violation=1).
Columns (1) and (3) use all observations that can be matched to the covenant violation data and columns (2)
and (4) re-estimate the specification with violating issuers dropped from the sample. H-I Zone is a dummy
variable equal to one if the issuer is near a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold one year prior to getting a bond
rated (see Section 2 for details). All the control variables used in the main specification are included in these
regressions. Table A.1 in the Appendix outlines the construction of the control variables. All standard errors
are clustered by issuer.
Panel A: Refinancing Bonds
(1) (2)
Cut R&D Cut SG&A
H-I Zone 0.261∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗
(0.00) (0.01)
Controls, Industry FE Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes
Observations 417 634
R2 0.395 0.264
Panel B: Covenant Violations
Cut R&D Cut SG&A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H-I Zone 0.198∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗ 0.080∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
Cov Violation 0.107 0.076
(0.36) (0.36)
Controls, Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 512 490 1116 1063
R2 0.259 0.258 0.125 0.127
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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